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INTRODUCTION 
The Thirteenth Amendment currently enjoys a robust renaissance 
among legal scholars who contend that it provides a judicial remedy for 
and congressional authority to proscribe the “badges and incidents of 
slavery.”1 As discussed below, this interpretation, although not self-
evident from the Amendment’s bare text, is well supported by the 
Amendment’s history and context, the Framers’ explicit intentions, the 
legislative debates in Congress leading to the Amendment’s adoption, 
                                                     
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
 1. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers spoke extensively of eliminating the “badges” of 
slavery and the “incidents” of slavery. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 570–78 (2012). The unitary phrase “badges and 
incidents of slavery” is generally traced to the Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (stating that 
the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to “pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing 
all badges and incidents of slavery”). 
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and the contemporaneous legal understanding of the ways in which the 
Slave Power that had come to dominate and distort American society. 
This Article briefly explores whether the Thirteenth Amendment 
applies to class-based subordination and concludes that it generally does 
not, at least not in such broad terms. The Amendment’s text, history, 
context, and intent do not support an interpretation of the Amendment as 
generally prohibiting discrimination or subordination based on social 
class distinctions per se that are completely detached from the legacy of 
chattel slavery or involuntary servitude. Rather, this Article argues, it is 
only when class-based distinctions are so impermeable and of such mag-
nitude as to transform class into caste, thus constituting a near-total al-
ienation from civil society akin to that characteristic of the system of 
slavery, that the Thirteenth Amendment would apply. 
To be clear from the outset: in arguing that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment does not reach generalized class-based subordination, this Article 
does not contend that these issues are unimportant. To the contrary, the 
increasingly rigid class-based stratification of our society,2 rampant dis-
crimination against the poor,3 increasing income inequality,4 and the 
concentration of enormous wealth in the hands of so few5 are pressing 
social challenges that must be addressed, and the legal system has a role 
in addressing these challenges. This Article argues, however, that the 
Thirteenth Amendment is not the most appropriate tool to address these 
                                                     
 2. See, e.g., PABLO A. MITNIK & DAVID B. GRUSKY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & RUSSELL 
SAGE FOUND., ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2015), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/07/economicmobilityintheunitedstates.pdf?la=en; 
Bernice Lott, The Social Psychology of Class and Classism, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 650, 650 
(2012); Michael Hout, How Class Works in Popular Conception: Most Americans Identify with the 
Class Their Income, Occupation, and Education Implies for Them 3 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Survey 
Research Ctr., 2007), available at http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/rsfcensus/papers/Hout-
ClassIDJan07.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., Heather Bullock, Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological Analysis of Beliefs 
About Poverty and the Poor 2 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at 
http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper06/paper08/working_paper06-08.pdf; Dis-
crimination, Inequality, and Poverty—A Human Rights Perspective, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 
11, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/11/discrimination-inequality-and-poverty-human-
rights-perspective. 
 4. Jonathan Fisher, Jeffrey Thompson & Timothy Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS, 
Special Issue 2015, at 22, 22, available at 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/sotu/SOTU_2015.pdf; Janet C. Gornick & Branko Milanovic, 
Income Inequality in the United States in Cross-National Perspective: Redistribution Revisited 3 
(Lux. Income Study Ctr., 2015), available at https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-
Graduate-Center/PDF/Centers/LIS/LIS-Center-Research-Brief-1-2015.pdf; MARK MATHER & BETH 
JAROSZ, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, POPULATION BULLETIN: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF 
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014), available at http://www.prb.org/pdf14/united-states-
inequality.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 8 (2015). 
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challenges because subordination or discrimination based on class or 
poverty does not, at a generalized level, amount to a badge or incident of 
slavery. Moreover, the Thirteenth Amendment’s intent, context, and his-
tory make clear that its Framers were concerned with specific forms of 
class-based subordination connected with or arising out of the system of 
slavery: examples of such subordination include the de jure or de facto 
economic subjugation of laborers via the extraction of their uncompen-
sated labor through state or private action, the creation of conditions that 
effectively prohibited laborers’ free choice of their employer and work-
ing conditions, and the maintenance of a labor system wherein the com-
pensation and conditions of certain groups of workers were artificially 
suppressed through the exploitation of an even less empowered group of 
workers (i.e., slaves). In sum, this Article’s skepticism regarding whether 
the Thirteenth Amendment can be fairly construed to prohibit class-
based subordination is limited to class-based subordination in its broad-
est form, not in its particulars. 
Regardless of whether the Thirteenth Amendment could be fairly 
construed to prohibit class-based subordination in general (which this 
Article argues against) or in the particulars (which very well may be the 
case, as discussed above), there is currently very little reason to believe 
that the Amendment will be so construed by the courts and policymakers 
charged with interpreting and enforcing it. As discussed in Part II.C, in-
fra, there are significant reasons to be highly skeptical that the doctrinal 
groundwork has yet been laid for such a theory of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to take root; the federal courts (in particular, the Supreme 
Court) are therefore exceedingly unlikely to extend current doctrine in a 
single leap in order to incorporate such a theory. 
After describing a defensible theoretical frame for when the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s command to rid the country of the vestiges of the 
slave system applies to class-based subordination, this Article concludes 
by briefly sketching the outline of one such scenario: the insurmountable 
caste system created by mass incarceration. This caste system is created 
by the interlocking and mutually reinforcing effects of mass incarcera-
tion, such as felony disenfranchisement, barriers to employment, and 
widespread reincarceration due to inability to pay fines. These effects 
result in the near-complete alienation of former prisoners (particularly 
persons of color) from civil society. 
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I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S CURRENT SCOPE AND 
APPLICABILITY 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment’s History and Context 
The Thirteenth Amendment was the culmination of a decades-long 
campaign by social movement and political actors to abolish slavery in 
the United States.6 It was also in significant part a reaction to the specific 
cultural, legal, political, and economic structures that supported slavery 
or developed because of it. Understanding the Thirteenth Amendment 
therefore requires understanding the system of slavery the Amendment 
was designed to abolish and the forces its Framers were reacting against. 
Although a comprehensive examination of the nature of slavery and abo-
lition is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, it is nonetheless 
worthwhile to review briefly the contemporaneous context in which the 
Amendment was adopted with an eye toward discerning the legal, histor-
ical, and social structures it was designed to abolish along with abolish-
ing slavery itself. 
Initially, slavery in the “new world” colonies followed the 
then-prevalent model of time-limited indentures or uncompensated labor 
for a finite (albeit often very lengthy) term of years.7 As American slav-
ery evolved in response to changing social and economic needs,8 howev-
er, it became a system of perpetual, inheritable, race-based subjugation, 
under which the slaves were treated as property, and all blacks, even if 
free, were subject to the same stigmatization. The American slave re-
gime, which existed as a matter of law for approximately 250 years,9 
                                                     
 6. See Alexander Tsesis, Introduction: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Revolutionary Aims, in 
THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 6–12 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (tracing the history of abolitionism and its influence 
upon the Thirteenth Amendment); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 15–16 (1977) (same). 
 7. Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 105, 107 (Jean Allain ed., 2012) (“The first Africans in Virginia were 
treated as indentured servants, held for a term of years, and then eligible for freedom.”). 
 8. See generally id. (describing the evolution of African slavery in the United States and how 
the laws and norms governing slavery changed in response to differing social and economic impera-
tives over time, for example: increasing slave populations in Southern states that were argued to 
justify more brutal control over the slaves, the greater fear of domestic slave rebellions as slave 
populations increased, the examples of successful slave rebellions abroad (as in Haiti), increasing 
dependence of southern economies upon slave labor and the concomitant fear that those economies 
would collapse without slave labor, and rising abolitionist sentiment over time in the North in favor 
of immediate emancipation rather than the gradualism that had previously prevailed). 
 9. The American institution of legalized chattel slavery is generally dated as beginning in 1619 
with the sale of twenty enslaved Africans to British colonialists in North America. See A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD 20 (1978) (discussing the legal status of blacks in 1619 Jamestown). It is worth 
remembering that the history of legal enslavement has to date lasted a full century longer than the 
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both depended upon and gave rise to several mutually reinforcing legal, 
social, political, religious, and economic justifications and conditions. As 
is well known, the legal system formally legitimized the institution of 
slavery by defining slaves as “property” and by protecting the interests of 
slave owners in that property.10 The legal system also further dehuman-
ized blacks in a myriad of other ways, denying them the civil rights to 
which they would presumably be entitled were they considered to be full 
human beings and citizens of the United States.11 Such denial of legal 
rights and civil status to both slaves and free blacks initially served pri-
marily instrumental purposes, including: giving the owner the legal right 
to profit from the slave’s labor without providing compensation; permit-
ting and immunizing from prosecution or civil recourse the violence and 
coercion necessary to compel such labor; granting the master the legal 
right to purchase, lease, leverage, and dispose of slaves (and their chil-
dren) without even the rudimentary labor protections afforded to non-
slaves at the time; and, as with other chattel, giving the owner the legal 
right to dispose of it when its utility had ended.12 
As slavery became fully entrenched, several factors became per-
ceived as real threats to the economic and social order of the slavehold-
ing South. Those factors included the growing black populations in 
slaveholding states, the concomitant fear of slave rebellions, and the abo-
litionist movement— which was tentative at first, then expressed with 
increasing vigor and virulence. Slavery thus became an ideological bat-
tle, and law and custom evolved in defense of slavery. Thus, while the 
panoply of laws and customs discussed above continued to serve their 
original instrumental purposes, they also served the expressive purpose 
of dehumanizing slaves (and by extension, all blacks) as completely un-
                                                                                                                       
history of freedom from bondage (i.e., 1619 to the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1865, 
versus 1865 to the present day). 
 10. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 646 (1842) (holding that the Fugi-
tive Slave Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce constitutional rights—
specifically, “property” rights of slave owners to recapture escaped slaves). 
 11. For example, slaves (and free blacks in most states) were denied “the rights to enforce 
contracts, sue, give evidence in court, inherit, and purchase, lease, hold, and convey real property.” 
ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 45 (2004) (citing 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer)). They were also de-
nied parental and familial rights, deprived of personal liberty, and denied the ability to receive an 
education. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the 
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1324, nn.33–34 (2007) and accom-
panying text. 
 12. See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (1982) (describing the instrumental features of the American slave system). 
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deserving of either civil rights or moral empathy.13 This expressive func-
tion was important in relieving the tension always inherent in American 
slavery, that “a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to equal rights 
happened also to be the nation, by the mid-nineteenth century, with the 
largest number of slaves in the Western Hemisphere.”14 Such potential 
social dissonance was lessened by the “othering” and dehumanization of 
the enslaved. If slaves (and as a corollary, all blacks) were presumed to 
be less than fully human, then a fortiori they were not entitled to the nat-
ural rights and freedoms—including freedom from bondage—that all 
human beings were presumed to possess. In sum, “the system of slavery 
depended not only upon the coercive power to deny freedom and equali-
ty to blacks but also to a significant degree upon the expressive power of 
law and custom to deny the validity of the idea of black freedom and 
equality.”15 
In addition to reconciling the ideal of liberty for all with the reality 
of the brutal enslavement of some, the American legal system abetted the 
system of slavery in numerous specific ways. The law provided a matrix 
of slavery-supporting structures by, for example, criminalizing certain 
conduct only when engaged in by blacks;16 permitting warrantless 
searches, seizures, and arrests without cause or on the merest pretext;17 
                                                     
 13. Thus, “any judicial protection of the slave would trigger further challenges to the legitima-
cy of the dehumanized status of blacks and slaves” because viewing slaves as rights-holders would 
erode the view that they were less than full human beings. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 9, at 8. 
 14. David Brion Davis, Foreword: The Rocky Road to Freedom—Crucial Barriers to Abolition 
in the Antebellum Years, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY 
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT xi, xvi (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010). 
 15. William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1855, 1859 (2012). 
 16. Under the Slave Codes, the defendant’s race was explicitly stated as a determinative ele-
ment of various crimes. In Virginia, for example, “[s]laves could receive the death penalty for at 
least sixty-eight offenses, whereas for whites the same conduct was either at most punishable by 
imprisonment or was not a crime at all.” A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law 
Only as an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebel-
lum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 977 (1992). Notably, the pervasive conflation 
of blackness with a presumption of criminality also had the corollary effect of placing whites in 
constant fear of blacks, thereby making whites more willing to accept black subjugation in the name 
of white safety. William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial 
Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 68–69 (2004) (“Th[e] myth of innate black immorality 
and criminality significantly aided the dehumanization of African Americans in the collective white 
mind. If all blacks were innate savages, not only were they less than human and therefore fit to be 
enslaved, but white guilt was also lessened by appealing to white fear as a justification for black 
enslavement.”); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 109–10 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1968) (noting that the preamble to the 
South Carolina Slave Code specifically sought to justify the slave code as necessary to “tend[ing] to 
the safety and security of the [white] people of this Province and their estates.”). 
 17. See Carter, supra note 16, at 64 and authorities cited therein (discussing slave code provi-
sions and law enforcement practices authorizing race-based searches, seizures, and arrests without 
individual suspicion and without judicial process). 
2016] Class as Caste 819 
restricting freedom of movement through, inter alia, requiring that slaves 
have and display a pass from the master when unaccompanied by a white 
person;18 prohibiting the education of slaves;19 prohibiting civil marriag-
es;20 prohibiting slaves (and in many states, free blacks) from owning 
property or forming binding contracts;21 and, of course, denying the fun-
damental rights of citizenship, including the rights to vote, to due pro-
cess, to free speech, and to be judged by a jury of one’s peers.22 
The Framers designed the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate this 
racial caste-based alienation from civil society and also to eliminate the 
supporting laws and customs enforcing it.23 These laws and customs 
were not merely instances of unequal treatment imposed solely through 
the ill intent of discrete actors. Rather, the “Slave Power,” as it became 
known, was understood to be systemic and deeply interwoven into the 
fabric of American society.24 Slavery, under this view, had become “the 
master of the Government and the people”;25 conversely, then, the “death 
                                                     
 18. See id. at 63 and authorities cited therein (describing the pass requirements of various slave 
codes). 
 19. See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE 
AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS 
STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 319–23 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) 
(1853) (surveying the various legal penalties for violating laws prohibiting educating slaves). 
 20. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 182 (De St. Romes 1825). See generally Darlene C. Goring, 
The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1018 (Brittan and DeWolf 1852); LA. CIV. CODE art. 174 (De St. 
Romes 1825). 
 22. For examples of provisions limiting voting to white males at least 21 years of age, see, for 
example, MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. VII, VIII; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. 
III, § 14. See also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 316–20 (rev. ed. 2000). For an example of free speech limita-
tions, see GA. CODE ch. XXXIV, art. 16 (Trow 1845) (restricting persons of color from preaching or 
exhorting without a license). With regard to jury trial rights, see, for example, GA. CODE ch. 
XXXIV, art. 27 (Trow 1845); TENN. CODE pt. III, tit. 4, ch. 5, art. II, § 4002 and pt. II, tit. 5, ch. 3, 
art. IV, § 2633 (Eastman 1858) (limiting jury service to whites). 
 23. For example, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, one of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
most forceful advocates in Congress, argued during the Thirteenth Amendment debates that the 
Amendment was designed to “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chatteliz-
ing [sic], degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, every-
thing connected with it or pertaining to it.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1319, 1321, 
1324 (1864). 
 24. “The idea of a southern ‘Slave Power’ that dominated national politics . . . emerged in the 
1830’s and became part of the nation’s political discourse in the years leading up to the Civil War.” 
Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 801 
(2011). Indeed, Senator (and later Vice President) Henry Wilson’s three-volume treatise surveying 
slavery and slavery’s destruction was entitled the “History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in 
America.” See HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 
(Samuel Hunt ed., 1872). 
 25. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1323 (1864) (statement of Sen. Wilson of Mas-
sachusetts). 
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of slavery [would be] the life of the Nation.”26 By the 1850s, what had 
been clear to the enslaved since the Founding had finally become clear to 
both the mainstream and more radical Republicans: that the Constitu-
tion’s compromise with slavery had failed. These Republicans became 
the driving force behind the Thirteenth Amendment. The series of politi-
cal and constitutional crises27 that accelerated the path to war revealed in 
stark relief that the still-young nation could not endure “permanently half 
slave and half free. . . . It [would] become all one thing, or all the oth-
er.”28 The Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalized the practical end 
result of the Civil War: that the Slave Power would no longer rule the 
nation; that the maintenance of a permanent racial caste system would no 
longer be abetted or condoned by law; and that the badges and incidents 
of slavery would be abolished along with slavery itself. 
B. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers and Their Understanding of the 
Relationship Between Slavery, Race, and “Class” 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers expressed little explicit con-
cern during the framing debates regarding class qua class. This is unsur-
prising for several reasons. First, our contemporary language regarding 
“class” had not at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment debates truly 
entered the American jurisprudential, philosophical, ideological, or lay 
lexicons.29 Second, the urgent issue was slavery and the consequences 
thereof, not social class in the way we think of it today.30 Third, the inci-
dents of slavery that the Framers did discuss and that do relate to what 
we conceive of today as class issues were generally discussed as conse-
quences of slavery rather than as independent targets of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. For example, the depression of working-class whites’ wag-
es due to competing unpaid slave labor was discussed at some length in 
the framing debates as one of the many damaging consequences of the 
Slave Power; but it was slavery itself, rather than the low wages availa-
                                                     
 26. Id. at 1319. 
 27. See William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Constitutional Change, 38 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 583, 585 nn.6–7 (2014) (describing how the Kansas-Nebraska 
dispute regarding extension of slavery into the frontier territories and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dred Scott sharpened the divisions that ultimately led to war). 
 28. Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1898), in 2 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis in original). 
 29. See, e.g., SOCIAL CLASS AND STRATIFICATION: CLASSIC STATEMENTS AND THEORETICAL 
DEBATES 2, 4 (Rhonda F. Levine ed., 1998); DENNIS GILBERT & JOSEPH A. KAHL, THE AMERICAN 
CLASS STRUCTURE 4, 8 (3d ed. 1987). 
 30. Indeed, slavery and its consequences, in the minds of the Framers and many members of 
the public on both sides of the debate, was an existential issue for the survival of the Nation. 
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ble to nonslave laborers, that was viewed as the condition to be ad-
dressed by the Thirteenth Amendment.31 
Although the framing debates do not directly address class issues, 
they do, however, reveal an understanding of slavery as a system that 
permanently demarcated social class by race. The Framers conceptual-
ized slavery as establishing a racial caste system for both slaves and free 
blacks. Justice Harlan provided the most familiar (albeit retrospective) 
recitation of the Framers’ views in this regard in his Plessy v. Ferguson32 
dissent: 
[I]n view of the [C]onstitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no 
caste here. Our [C]onstitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citi-
zens are equal before the law. 
. . . . 
It was adjudged in [Dred Scott] that the descendants of Africans 
who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, were not 
included nor intended to be included under the word ‘citizens’ in the 
[C]onstitution . . . and, whether emancipated or not . . . had no rights 
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the govern-
ment might choose to grant them. The recent amendments of the 
[C]onstitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles 
from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the 
states, a dominant race,-a superior class of citizens,-which assumes 
to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, up-
on the basis of race.33 
                                                     
 31. For example, Representative Ingersoll of Illinois stated during the Thirteenth Amendment 
debates that the Amendment would apply to “the seven millions of poor white people who live in the 
slave States but who have ever been deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of . . . slavery,” 
presumably by virtue of the unpaid labor pool that slavery provided, which drove down the wages of 
the white laboring class and made labor seem dishonorable. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2989, 2990 (1864). Similarly, Representative Wilson of Iowa argued during the debates that “the 
poor white man” had been “impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a 
badge of disgrace.” See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864)). Moreover, some 
early judicial decisions construing the Thirteenth Amendment interpreted it as applying beyond the 
freedmen, at least in principle. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 
1866) (No. 16,151), cited in Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 901 (1986) (stating, in finding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 to be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, that the Amendment 
“throws its protection over every one, of every race, color, and condition”). 
 32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 33. Id. at 559–60 (citation omitted). 
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Justice Harlan’s dissent may be of somewhat limited value as an exercise 
in pure history in discerning how the Framers actually viewed issues of 
class through the prism of the Thirteenth Amendment. Among other rea-
sons, his dissent was not written contemporaneously with the framing 
experience and therefore may suffer from both presentism and inaccura-
cy; moreover, it was, like much historical information that is cited in the 
context of litigation, history deployed for instrumental purposes rather 
than history qua history. As a jurisprudential matter, however, Justice 
Harlan’s summary of the Framers’ views of slavery as creating a race-
based caste system can be a useful starting point for Thirteenth Amend-
ment interpretation. Reviewing the original source material (i.e., the 
Thirteenth Amendment debates) reveals that Justice Harlan’s account of 
this issue is consistent with the views the Framers expressed.34 It is also 
consistent with the actual American experience of slavery. For example, 
if slavery were separable from notions of permanence and impermeabil-
ity characterizing racial caste norms, then one would expect that the legal 
disabilities, discrimination, and stigmatization associated therewith 
would have been limited to those blacks who were actually enslaved. 
Former slaves and the free black descendants of slaves would not have 
been subjected to the same legal and social subordination as slaves if 
slavery were merely about servitude, as opposed to being equally about 
racial caste and white supremacy. As a simple example, the “one-drop 
rule”35 would have made little sense were it not for the racial caste con-
ception of slavery: a racial caste is (conceptually) something that is in-
heritable via lineal descent; a labor status is not. 
C. The Thirteenth Amendment as Applied by the Courts and Congress 
Notwithstanding the history and context described in Sections A 
and B, supra, the Thirteenth Amendment’s full potential scope remains 
under-realized. The Amendment’s goal of empowering the federal gov-
ernment to proscribe and remediate the vestiges of slavery has not been 
matched by the scope of its application in the courts and in Congress. In 
the area of racial discrimination, Congress has not since the Reconstruc-
tion era relied upon the Thirteenth Amendment to enact civil rights legis-
                                                     
 34. For example, Senator Henderson of Missouri stated, “I will not be intimidated by the fears 
of negro equality. The negro may possess mental qualities entitling him to a position beyond our 
present belief. If so, I shall put no obstacle in the way of his elevation. There is nothing in me that 
despises merit or envies its rewards.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1463, 1465 (1864). 
 35. The “one-drop” rule was the legal conception that any cognizable fractional percentage of 
black lineal descent defined an individual as being on the black side of the legal, social, and cultural 
color lines, the corollary being that “purity” of a white bloodline was a requirement in order to quali-
fy as white and obtain the benefits associated therewith. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1737 (1993). 
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lation.36 Moreover, cases where courts have rejected litigants’ claims 
based upon the badges and incidents of slavery theory of the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself are legion,37 while cases accepting that theory are few 
and far between.38 The track record regarding assertions that nonracial 
subordination amounts to a badge or incident of slavery is equally dis-
mal. Research for this Article reveals exactly one federal statute since 
Reconstruction enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
power to proscribe the badges and incidents of slavery as to nonracial 
classes,39 no cases where litigants have actually succeeded in pressing 
                                                     
 36. During Reconstruction, Congress exercised its power under the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
Enforcement Clause to enact several civil rights statutes prohibiting what Congress believed to be 
badges or incidents of slavery. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (protecting the equal rights of all citizens to 
make and enforce contracts), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (protecting equal rights to buy, sell and lease proper-
ty), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing civil action for deprivation of rights), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1987–1991 
(describing federal proceedings for enforcing civil rights) were all originally enacted as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (prohibiting peonage) was originally enacted 
as part of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 546. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (providing criminal 
penalties and civil liability for conspiracies to violate civil rights) was originally enacted as part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. 
 37. I am speaking here of cases alleging constitutional claims directly under Section 1 of the 
Amendment, rather than under a statute enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Amendment whereby 
Congress has defined the complained-of injury as a badge or incident of slavery. For further discus-
sion, see, for example, Carter, supra note 11, at 1339–55. 
 38. Lower court cases rejecting badges and incidents of slavery claims include NAACP v. 
Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989); Washington 
v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981); Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Keithly v. Univ. of Tex. 
Sw. Med. Ctr., 2003 WL 22862798, No. Civ.A. 303CV0452L (N.D. Tex., Nov. 18, 2003); Crenshaw 
v. City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 
635 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Davidson v. 
Yeshiva Univ., 555 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1980). Indeed, at least 
two courts have found that asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment provides a direct cause of action 
for the badges or incidents of slavery is so fanciful as to be frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Adams, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 426; Sanders, 635 F. Supp. at 87. The only 
case that (admittedly noncomprehensive) research for this Article revealed wherein a court has ac-
cepted such a badges and incidents of slavery claim is Vann v. Kempthorne, 467 F. Supp. 2d 56 
(D.D.C. 2006). The court there found that a Thirteenth Amendment claim could be brought against 
the Cherokee Nation, notwithstanding its sovereign immunity. Id. at 67. Even Vann, however, is at 
least implicitly based upon the overlay of congressional approval for allowing the badges and inci-
dents of slavery claim to proceed, rather than acceptance that the self-executing core of Section 1 
itself provides redress for the badges and incidents of slavery. In Vann, the court found that Con-
gress, in enacting the Treaty of 1866, “incorporated the principles of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866” into the Treaty and thereby made Thirteenth Amendment rights (in-
cluding the right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery) applicable to the Cherokee 
Nation. Id. at 68. Moreover, the district court’s holding that the treaty abrogated the tribe’s sovereign 
immunity was reversed on appeal. Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (leaving 
undisturbed, however, the finding that the Thirteenth Amendment claim (and other claims) could 
proceed against individual tribal officers, notwithstanding the immunity of the tribe as sovereign). 
 39. Since Reconstruction, the only federal statute this author can identify as being based ex-
plicitly upon Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is the Matthew Shep-
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claims that the Thirteenth Amendment itself provides a remedy for non-
racial discrimination, and only one Supreme Court case that even exam-
ines in passing (in brief dictum) whether the badges and incidents of 
slavery encompasses class-based discrimination.40 
The near-total absence of federal legislation addressing nonracial 
discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment together with litigants’ 
lack of success in pressing such claims, is not, of course, conclusive 
proof that the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be fairly interpreted to pro-
hibit class-based subordination. The absence of developments in this di-
rection in the case law and the legislative process does indicate, however, 
that neither the courts nor Congress are currently likely to embrace the 
Amendment as applicable to class-based subordination. I have long been 
skeptical that, as a practical matter, courts would embrace such a theo-
ry.41 That skepticism has only increased over time, given that constitu-
tional equality doctrine has generally grown only more cabined and 
cramped as time has progressed.  
Moreover, it is fair to say that the Thirteenth Amendment’s self-
executing applicability remains less than completely secure, even in its 
applicability to race-based injuries clearly linked to slavery.42 Indeed, 
recent federal hate crimes legislation wherein Congress has explicitly 
exercised its Section 2 power to define a condition as a badge or incident 
of slavery is now being questioned in light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the other Recon-
struction Amendments.43 My overarching point is that I am cautious 
                                                                                                                       
ard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111–84, div. E., § 4702(7), 123 
Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)), which, inter alia, extended federal hate 
crimes law to cover attacks based upon sexual orientation. 
 40. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court held that a violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3) (2012), originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and based upon the 
Thirteenth Amendment, requires proof of “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious-
ly discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added). The empha-
sized portion is dictum because Griffin itself involved racial discrimination, not “class.” In any 
event, the Court’s brief statement is far too conditional and undefined to present the basis for a ro-
bust theory of the discrimination based on social class as a badge or incident of slavery. 
 41. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1355–65. 
 42. Despite the voluminous evidence of original intent that the Amendment would end both 
slavery and its concomitant vestiges, the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself provides a cause of action to address the badges and incidents of slavery (although 
it noted in Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1985), that Congress’s power to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment “is not inconsistent with the view that the Amendment has self-executing 
force,” and in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), specifically left open the 
question of “[w]hether or not the Amendment itself did any more than [abolish slavery].”). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting defendants’ 
challenge to the constitutionality of the James L. Byrd and Matthew Shephard Hate Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 249 (2012), which relied in part upon the Thirteenth Amendment to expand the scope of 
federal hate crimes law). 
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about seeking further doctrinal extensions that may weaken the founda-
tional badges and incidents of slavery doctrine by moving too far too 
fast, and I am also skeptical in any event that such extensions would be 
judicially embraced without prior step-by-step evolution of the doctrine. 
II. CLASS AS CASTE: THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 
I have previously advocated for an interpretive approach that would 
define the scope of the badges and incidents of slavery theory with refer-
ence to two touchstones: (1) the connection the group to which the plain-
tiff belongs or that Congress seeks to protect has to the institution of 
chattel slavery; and (2) the connection the complained of injury or pro-
scribed condition has to the institution of chattel slavery.44 Cases in 
which those two touchstones overlap completely would be the clearest 
example of a condition amounting to a legacy of the system of slavery. 
Where they do not overlap completely, I have argued that as the connec-
tion of the plaintiff (or the protected class) to the legacy of slavery grows 
weaker, the connection that the complained-of injury has to the system of 
slavery must grow correspondingly stronger in order for the claim or 
statute to be within the badges and incidents of slavery power. 
Notwithstanding my skepticism about the Thirteenth Amendment 
as a remedy for generalized class discrimination, one example where ap-
plying the framework above may lead to the conclusion that a class-
based distinction amounts to a badge or incident of slavery involves the 
most severe and persistent effects of mass incarceration. The thesis is 
straightforward: racialized policies giving rise to mass incarceration re-
sult in a permanent caste distinction of such magnitude and impermeabil-
ity as to arguably amount to a badge or incident of slavery. Many of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers specifically argued that the Amend-
ment would forbid the permanent subordination under color of law of a 
despised and identifiable group.45 It is, of course, true that the specific 
                                                     
 44. Carter, supra note 11, at 1366–78. 
 45.  For example, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, one of the Senate’s primary champions of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, stated the debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (enacted pursuant 
to the Thirteenth Amendment): 
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction of the incidents to 
slavery. 
 Those laws that prevented the colored man from going from home, that did not al-
low him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to own property; 
that did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all 
badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery. They never 
would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for slavery, and when slavery falls 
they fall also. 
 . . . . 
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groups they were concerned with were the freedmen and free blacks, but 
the reasoning is instructive. As noted in Part II.A, supra, the Framers 
understood the system of slavery as involving more than uncompensated 
labor. Rather, while slavery worked its most brutal and direct effects up-
on those actually enslaved, the all-encompassing Slave Power was seen 
as having perverted the country as a whole. One aspect of the Slave 
Power was that it legalized white supremacy and demonized non-
whiteness. Thus, nonslave blacks suffered the same civil disabilities in 
the slaveholding states (and many non-slaveholding states) as blacks who 
were actually enslaved. Moreover, the line between slave and nonslave 
status for blacks was as simple as crossing a state line into a slaveholding 
state. Phrased differently, then, all members of a group sharing a com-
mon immutable characteristic (i.e., African descent) were bounded with-
in the same category: subject to enslavement and subject to the same civ-
il disabilities. It was this feature and function of the Slave Power that the 
Thirteenth Amendment found philosophically objectionable and incon-
sistent with American democracy: the use of a single trait or status 
(race/non-whiteness) as permanently defining one’s status before the law 
for all time, with no possibility of redemption as a member of civil socie-
ty.46 
The persistent effects of mass incarceration create a large, racial-
ized, near-permanent underclass unable to overcome its alienation from 
civil society. In short, racialized legislation, law enforcement actions, 
and prosecutorial policies have led to massive racial disparities in those 
incarcerated. The status of having been incarcerated results in alienation 
from civil society in a wide variety of circumstances. Felony disenfran-
chisement laws render persons affected by the laws and policies leading 
to mass incarceration unable to directly influence the very law and poli-
cies at issue. The extreme difficulty of securing legitimate employment 
as an ex-offender due to many employers’ policies against hiring ex-
offenders incentivizes some ex-offenders to commit sustenance crimes 
                                                                                                                       
 I have no doubt that under [the Thirteenth Amendment] we may destroy all these 
discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional 
amendment amounts to nothing. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 321, 322 (1866). 
 46. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers argued that nothing but innate ability and hard work 
should represent a ceiling to human worth and achievement, at least in the eyes of the law. For ex-
ample, during the Thirteenth Amendment debates, Representative Wilson of Iowa characterized the 
founding American principle as follows: “[T]he new [American] Republic . . . proclaimed in the ear 
of all humanity that the poor, the humble, the sons of toil, whose hands were hardened by honest 
labor, whose limbs were chilled by the blasts of winter, whose cheeks were scorched by the suns of 
summer, were the peers, the equals, before the law, of kings and princes and nobles . . . .” CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319 (1864). The most famous living example of this ethos among the 
Framing generation was, of course, President Lincoln’s rise from humble origins. 
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(e.g., shoplifting and petty theft) or drug-trafficking crimes (because the 
underground drug economy is in many neighborhoods the most readily-
available source of income), leading to their reincarceration. For those 
who avoid participation in the underground economy, the absence of 
available legitimate work often renders them unable to pay the panoply 
of fines levied repeatedly and disproportionately upon persons of color 
(as recently documented in Ferguson, Missouri47 and elsewhere), and the 
inability to pay such fines often results in reincarceration and their fur-
ther alienation from civil society. Thus, the racialized caste boundary 
created and reinforced by the carceral state remains permanent. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that generalized class-based discrimination 
is unlikely to be found to be a badge or incident of slavery. Nonetheless, 
there may be particularized instances of status discrimination that are tied 
sufficiently closely to the legacy of slavery and to the Framers’ ex-
pressed intentions in adopting the Thirteenth Amendment that they may 
well be within the Amendment’s scope.  Expanding the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription of the badges and incidents of 
slavery is most likely to be successful via modest, step-by-step, doctrinal 
evolution. 
                                                     
 47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2015), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
